The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 48
Number 1 Parameters Spring 2018

Article 4

Spring 3-1-2018

LTG MaFarland: Insights on Illusions of Victory and Iraq
Russell W. Glenn

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War, and
Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Russell W. Glenn, "LTG MaFarland: Insights on Illusions of Victory and Iraq," Parameters 48, no. 1 (2018),
doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2847.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Illusions of Victory

LTG MacFarland: Insights on
Illusions of Victory and Iraq
Russell W. Glenn

I

n Illusions of Victory author Carter Malkasian describes the cumulative
events in Ramadi circa 2007 as comprising “a turning point of the
Iraq War.” 1 He is correct in terms of the war fought by the US-led
coalition in Iraq. Iraqis might have a contrary view given theirs has
been of an all but continuous conflict since that coalition attacked in
2003. The turning point from the perspective of the country’s citizenry
is arguably quite different, far broader in influence, and more negative
in consequence: American support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s
retaining his position after his loss in the March 2010 election. The
internal divides that continue to plague Iraq today are largely due to the
overt sectarianism that characterized his tenure.
Malkasian recognizes Maliki’s role in undoing the progress made
during the Awakening period (2007), as does Lieutenant General
MacFarland, as discussed in the interview below. Both men avoid the
common pitfall of overemphasizing a single factor as an explanation
for the progress made during and in the aftermath of that too-short
span of years. MacFarland’s assertion that the surge was less pivotal
than others have argued is convincing and well-supported. Other
factors—al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cruelty, the group’s deliberate targeting
of civilians, cohesion among tribes, US financial and other forms of
support, fear of “the Persians” in Iran, and Shia politicians in general
refusing to take the higher road after years of suppression under Saddam
Hussein—are among those identified and analysed. No few of these
topics receive attention in one or more of the many, and there are many,
other books regarding al-Anbar province during the middle of the last
decade. William Doyle’s A Soldier’s Dream, Kimberly Kagan’s The Surge:
A Military History, Peter R. Mansoor’s Surge, Jim Michaels’s, A Chance in
Hell, and Michael E. Silverman’s, Awakening Victory, which is a memoir
by a battalion commander in Anbar during this period, cover much of
the ground considered in Illusions of Victory from a variety of viewpoints.
It is therefore legitimate to question why Malkasian’s book deserves
attention as yet another offering. The answer lies in perspective. His book
is at times a broader investigation, one more strategic in perspective, and
sometimes counter to the alternative sources on events in Ramadi and alAnbar province during this critical period. Malkasian’s understanding of
tribal dynamics is among the best offered by Western authors addressing
competition for influencing the province. He avoids overly simplifying
the situation by recognizing the myriad factors influencing Anbari
support for AQI (and later the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]).
His analysis is balanced, recognizing the tribal and individual dynamics
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at play over time. The author similarly, critically, recognizes those
dynamics evolved over time. Originally reluctant to employ violence
against civilians other than those supporting the Baghdad government,
AQI cast that hesitation aside in light of other Anbari organizations’
success in competing for power and influence.
Malkasian’s late entry into discussions further benefits from the
passage of time. Why, he is able to ask, did the highly touted progress
made prior to the 2014 departure of most coalition forces evaporate
with the rise of ISIS? Yes, Maliki’s (and other Iraqi leaders’) malfeasance
was a key element in the return to previous levels of internecine violence.
Yet that exodus of US forces; consequent loss of moral, political, and
financial support; and inability of Anbari leaders to maintain a cohesive
resistance were undoubtedly complements to the distrust sown by
Baghdad in the rise of ISIS.
These positives considerably outweigh any negatives in Illusions of
Victory. Malkasian could have provided greater depth of analysis after
positing that Colonel John L. Gronski, commander of the 2nd Infantry
Brigade Combat Team, 28th Infantry Division, receives too little credit
for setting the conditions for the Awakening. Admirable as Gronski’s
initiatives were, it is questionable that they established the same kind
of relationships with sheikhs as did later US leaders or that Gronski’s
operations involved a level of risk similar to that assumed by subsequent
commanders who positioned their forces in more contested parts of
Iraq’s urban areas. So too, more pointed consideration of what the events
in Anbar offer for future counterinsurgent undertakings would have
helped to balance those superficial evaluations of counterinsurgency
(COIN) that suggest its total relegation to the dustbin of history
rather than providing more thoughtful evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of its application in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Malkasian’s primary focus is, by choice, the operational and tactical
levels of war. We therefore do not but once hear of the permeating
discomfort felt and suspicions held by regional Sunnis at the community
level in the aftermath of Saddam’s fall or the discomfort and suspicions
borne of his government’s replacement by an Iran-leaning authority.
Little wonder that several of these communities tolerated or provided
more substantive support to ISIS. He similarly does not delve into Maliki’s
motivations for his sectarianism, which in its rawest form was simply the
overt expression of Shia vengeance after decades of suppression under
Saddam’s thumb. Understandably, but perhaps naively, the world has
come to expect more of national leaders.2
Ironically, if we accept that Ramadi was a turning point during the
first phase of Iraq’s post-2003 invasion insurgency, it was equally so in 2016
when ISIS forces were defeated in the city—a defeat facilitated by a new
operational approach introduced by the recently arrived commanding
general of the Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve
(OIR) in Iraq and Syria. Ramadi’s fall at once shattered the myth of ISIS
invincibility while at the same time convincing Iraqi leaders of America’s
commitment to the group’s ouster. The ability of ISIS to recruit and
to maintain those leaders’ support suffered accordingly. As the past
2      The reviewer thanks Colonel Wade Foote, USA Retired, for his notable insights that underlie
the material in this paragraph and that immediately following.
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decade and a half has demonstrated the Middle East is nothing if not
extraordinarily complex. Perhaps regional stability rather than ideology
should take precedence when selecting America’s strategic objectives.
Then a colonel, MacFarland’s performance as the commander of 1st
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Tal Afar and
Ramadi receives considerable attention in this and many of the other
books addressing the war in Iraq. His later leadership of Operation
Inherent Resolve ran from September 2015 to August 2016, and
contributed valuable insight on Illusion of Victory during this interview
on January 23, 2018.

The Interview

Dr. Glenn. What is your overall impression of Carter
Malkasian’s book?
LTG M acFarland. Carter’s book provided me a bit more texture
regarding what had been going on around me. He filled in a lot of
gaps. He’s right that the success in al-Anbar and elsewhere was due to a
combination of factors. An Awakening-type of event requires elements
like those needed to operate an internal combustion engine: fuel, air,
and a spark. The fuel was obviously the tribes and number of fighters
who were willing to step up. Air was provided by the coalition; we gave
it the room to grow. The enemy provided the spark by overplaying their
hand and creating the backlash for the Awakening. You can’t have an
Awakening without all of those three elements present. And then success
begets success. That’s why when one tribe looked over at another tribe
and saw they had a pretty good thing going, they wanted to keep up with
the Joneses. That’s how it spread. It created a domino effect.
Glenn. In your experience, what factors were key to abetting US-led
coalition progress? Which instead reduced the extent and duration
of success?
M acFarland. I would think the main impediment to progress was,
of course, Maliki and his ilk and their natural suspicion of anything
to do with arming Sunnis. I saw a very similar reluctance in Baghdad
during Operation Inherent Resolve. Some things aren’t going to change.
Glenn. Focusing specifically on the Awakening, Malkasian blames
its “breakdown” on three factors: Maliki’s government turning against
the Sunnis, the tribal system’s inherent instability, and the Sunnis’ strong
support for AQI and the Islamic State.
Do you agree with his conclusions? Considering more than coalition
military capabilities alone, what could the United States have done to
prevent ISIS’s rise?
M acFarland. The Iraqi government tried to marginalize [the
Sunnis] while we were there and then actively turned against them when
we weren’t. [On the second point,] I don’t know if I would go so far as to
say the tribal system is inherently unstable. After all, it has endured for
over a millennium. I think it was destabilized by our actions as well as
Maliki’s . . . and even Saddam’s. A series of actors for differing reasons
actively sought to undermine or co-opt the tribes. It’s going on today in
Iraq during Inherent Resolve: Tehran is trying to buy off some Sunni
sheikhs to help them achieve their goals, which are really not in the best
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interests of the Sunnis. The MacFarland clan was a Scottish Highlands
clan that fought on both sides, against or for the British, depending on
the battle. The Sunni tribes are not that much different than a Highland
clan in that respect. You could often find them on both sides of a fight.
[Regarding the third point,] “AQI and then the Islamic State enjoyed
a critical mass of Sunni support.” This was engendered by Maliki’s
persecution of the Sunnis, driving them into the arms of al-Qaeda.
What could the US have done to prevent ISIS’s rise? Very simply:
stay engaged. If we had not pulled out of Iraq at the end of 2010 and
2011, ISIS wouldn’t have had the ability to grow because the Sunnis
would have felt they had a friendly external power in the United States
that they could turn to for arbitration with Maliki and his government.
But without us, they had no alternative other than ISIS. Although the
Sunnis were very suspicious of ISIS, they probably believed because
they had defeated al-Qaeda with the Awakening, they would be able
to control ISIS. What they didn’t bargain on was that ISIS was a more
virulent brand, which they weren’t able to control. But they were willing
to give ISIS a shot to act as a buffer between themselves, Maliki and
his government, and Tehran. Unfortunately, they were deluded in their
thinking because what had allowed them to defeat al-Qaeda was our
support. That wasn’t there this time.
Glenn. What did your enemy prisoners of war and other sources
tell you were the bases for successful AQI and ISIS recruiting? What
roles did insurgent intimidation of potential recruits, religion, money, or
other factors play? How might a US-led coalition impede an insurgent’s
success during future conflicts?
M acFarland. The basis for their recruiting was, “We’ll fight those
dirty rotten Shia for you.” “What roles did insurgent intimidation of
potential recruits play?” Well, they were running press gangs and forcing
children in some cases to fight under their banner as things became
more desperate. ISIS—and al-Qaeda to a lesser extent—forced people
into their ranks. They were not all willing believers. Religion played
about as much a role in recruiting as Catholicism did for the IRA [Irish
Republican Army]. The Troubles weren’t really about whether or not my
Irish forebears should go to Mass on feast days and honor the Virgin
Mary; it was really more about the Protestants representing an external
power, the British Crown. I think to a great extent the fighting in Iraq is
because, to the Sunnis, the Shias also represent a Persian foreign power.
They just don’t trust them. So religion’s a factor, but I don’t think it’s the
only or the biggest factor.
Money? Money had lot to do with ISIS. Once they took over the
oil fields in eastern Syria and then the banks in Mosul, they were an
incredibly well-financed organization. One of the key things we did was
begin a deep fight, a deliberate targeting of their oil, banks, and other
revenue streams. And that hollowed them out. In fact, I named our
counterrevenue campaign “Tidal Wave Two,” because their money was
predominantly oil based and [Operation] Tidal Wave was the name of
the bombing raids against the Ploeşti oil fields in Romania during the
Second World War. So we named our strikes on the ISIS oil fields in
eastern Syria, and around Mosul, in honor of that operation. We needed
to go after revenue streams, because you can have all of the ideology
in the world, but you also need money to wage a significant campaign.
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The other thing we must do to impede insurgent success is to have an
enduring presence in eastern Syria, northern Syria, western Iraq, and
northern Jordan to keep it from metastasizing.
Glenn. To what extent was there either formal or informal passage
of coalition lessons learned and insights between those in-country and
from rotation to rotation? Did this occur only internally to a service
(Army, Marines) or between services?
M acFarland. What [then-Colonel] H. R. McMaster did up in Tal
Afar—and I followed H. R. in Tal Afar before my brigade was ordered
to move to Ramadi—was definitely a model that I lifted and shifted to
our new area of operations. But the problem was that Tal Afar is a ship
in a bottle. It is a Turkmen city in an Arab country, so progress there
never had the potential of spreading. But because of my engagements
there and the opportunity to work with police, army, and so forth, I
could see that there were certain things happening in Tal Afar that were
not present in Ramadi. One of the things I had to do was [identify] a
mayor. The governor was basically the mayor of Ramadi, and there was
effectively no governor of al-Anbar.
No police or tribal force was present, either. There was the Western
Ramadi police station with about 140 cops when I got there, but they
weren’t really doing very much. My DCO [deputy commanding officer],
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lechner, stood up the west Jazirah police
station, which was actually a pump plant on the Euphrates River. It was
the first tribal police station, but it was not part of the central plan for
police stations where the [US Army] Corps of Engineers or anybody else
thought it should be. It was precisely where the tribes thought it should
be, however. So that’s where we put it, and a lot of former cops who had
been trained and were still on the payroll came out of the woodwork
with their old uniforms, willing to man that police station. These were
guys that were in the immediate area, but not reporting for duty out of
fear or intimidation.
We had to break that cycle of fear. Putting the police station where
they felt strong enough to man it was critically important. The enemy
also understood this, which is why they attacked the Jazirah police
station with a chlorine bomb, a massive car bomb, and a big fuel truck
as well. That fuel truck inflicted some pretty horrendous casualties on
both US Army MPs [military police] and the Iraqi police. Moments after
the attack, I drove over there and talked to the [Iraqi] lieutenant colonel
station chief and offered to move them onto [Camp] Blue Diamond
while we helped rebuild the police station. He said, “No, no, no. We can’t
let the enemy win.” I call it the Iwo Jima moment, Mount Suribachi: the
moment the Iraqi police put their flag back up that had been knocked
down by the blast, and that afternoon [they] went out on patrol looking
for the cell responsible for the truck bombing. . . . It was part of a series of
events that led to the Awakening. Al-Qaeda bombed the police station,
but that didn’t work. So, they killed the sheikh who was contributing
the young people for the police force. That was the final spark that
really initiated the Awakening process. But without that spark, and the
spontaneous reaction by the sheikhs, I couldn’t have done what I did.
Timing is everything, right?

20

Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018

There was no Awakening in Tal Afar. McMaster set up combat
outposts, but he overwhelmed the opposition with coalition forces
supported by Iraqi security forces. He leveraged the Shia population
within southern Tal Afar. Northern Tal Afar was still “indian territory”
when we got there. The Awakening was the sheikhs’ idea, and I just
went with it. Just as you set a thief to catch a thief, the tribal forces were
the ideal counter al-Qaeda force because they were truly an indigenous
force, even more than some of AQI.
“To what extent was there either formal or informal passage of
lessons learned and insights between those in-country and from rotation
to rotation?” There was a COIN academy in Taji, but I’m not sure how
much we got out of that. Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24, hadn’t
been written yet. In fact, General Petraeus, when he got there, asked me
if I’d read it. And I said, “No I haven’t. Sorry.” He said, “Well you don’t
need to. You’re doing everything it says.”
Glenn. How did your experiences in Tal Afar influence your
approaches to COIN in Ramadi?
M acFarland. What I thought was good about Tal Afar was the
combat outposts to secure neighborhoods, to lock them down. My idea
was to leapfrog and secure neighborhoods in Ramadi, turn them over to
Iraqi security forces, and then my guys could move onto the next set of
combat outposts (COPs). But I knew I would have to provide the Iraqi
police to fill in behind us. I thought it would be us, followed by the Iraqi
Army, and then the Iraqi police. What happened in practice is that we
turned COPs over directly to the Iraqi police, and the Iraqi police were
relieved of responsibilities outside of Ramadi by tribal auxiliary forces.
The Iraqi Army was just not interested in fighting their way into the
city. And even during Operation Inherent Resolve they said, “Well, you
know, the army doesn’t really fight in cities. The police go into cities and
the army stays on the outside.” The problem with that way of thinking
is that the enemy was in cities like Ramadi, Mosul, and elsewhere and
the police can’t do it all by themselves. The Iraqi Army has a very strong
self-preservation instinct, which is something you don’t typically find in
effective military forces. The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service, on the
other hand, had no such problem, so we relied heavily on them in OIR.
Glenn. How do you view the author’s analysis of al-Anbar tribal
relationships and motivations?
M acFarland. Abdul Sattar Abu Risha did not start out as the leader
of the Awakening. He was the spokesperson. The older sheikhs let this
young hothead be the face of the Awakening so that if anybody was
going to get assassinated, it was going to be Sattar. He parlayed that into
a more powerful role when he became the de facto leader, and we played
a role in that. I said, “Okay, if you’re running all the risks, then you are
going to get the rewards.” So I funnelled money through him to the
other sheikhs which elevated his status and gave him more wasta. It was
all quid pro quo, a symbiotic relationship.
Their sheikhs’ motivations were, in my opinion, mainly selfpreservation first of all, and then economic opportunity and political
power. They were concerned with two threats. They were caught
between the devil and the deep blue sea: the Persians—the Shia—and
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al-Qaeda. We offered them a way to rid themselves of al-Qaeda by
arming them. This gave them the means to defend themselves against
al-Qaeda and not have to rely on Persians from Baghdad, who would
be just as bad if not worse than al-Qaeda, at least in their eyes. You
don’t want to invite a vampire into your house if you don’t have to. So
we said we would help them develop a home guard. They could then
secure their own neighborhood and wouldn’t need help from Baghdad
or al-Qaeda. It’s the way things were 100 years ago when the tribes
provided their own security. That’s what was so attractive about this
to them: it was a combination of economic incentives and the ability to
defend themselves.
They also hated the Iraqi Islamic Party, the IIP—Governor
Mamoun [Sami Rashid] was a member of it—which they saw as aligned
with al-Qaeda because it got money from outside. So, the sheikhs saw
the IIP as more part of the problem than the solution and wanted
to rid themselves of it in order to become more self-governing. And
economically, these sheikhs make money from all sorts of sources,
either legal or questionable. Smuggling is historically what Bedouins
do. Perhaps that’s why there are so many truck companies in al-Anbar
province to run back and forth between Jordon and Syria to Baghdad.
But the tribes are also into construction. It seemed as though every
sheikh has his own construction company.
Glenn. Is Malkasian correct in noting, “Certain writers later accused
the Marines of opposing the [Sattar] movement” but “this is untrue?”
M acFarland. I would rephrase it. I would say the Marines were
leery of the Sattar movement and hesitant to embrace it initially. It took
them longer to come around than I would have liked, but I wouldn’t say
they opposed it. They were just more skeptical.
Glenn. You worked for the Marines. Did you being Army give you
more slack than if you had been a marine?
M acFarland. It worked to my benefit. I could not have asked for a
better boss than General Richard C. Zilmer. To be honest, if I had been
working for an Army headquarters, I don’t know that the Awakening
would have happened. That’s not a knock on the Army necessarily. But
General Zilmer epitomized the tenets of mission command better than
almost any boss I have ever had.
Glenn. Was Baghdad more willing to support Sunni counter–
AQI initiatives in al-Anbar than in Baghdad itself? If so, is the author
correct in concluding that the key variable was al-Anbar’s distance from
the capital?
M acFarland. Absolutely. I think the mind-set with Maliki was that
he was up to his eyeballs in Sunni terrorist crocodiles there in Baghdad.
If we could reduce the throughput from Syria in the pipeline that ran
through al-Anbar to Baghdad, it was a good thing. There were no real
Shia equities at risk out there. I think he figured what happens in alAnbar would stay in al-Anbar. He started to get a little more attentive
when the Awakening moved closer to Baghdad, but as long as it remained
out west he wasn’t too worried. Nevertheless, he remained reluctant to
provide any heavy weapons that could eventually be used against Iraqi
security forces.
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Glenn. But Fallujah and Ramadi weren’t really that far away
from Baghdad.
M acFarland. Well, Fallujah is pretty close. . . . And in Baghdad,
the Shia see Fallujah as the boogeyman, the number one place they need
to worry about. It is astride the historic line of drift of bad actors and is
the first major town of any size outside of Baghdad that is Sunni. They
are pretty worried about it and keep an eye on it. So, yeah, Carter was
right about that.
Glenn. Malkasian wrote, “In September 2015, Sean MacFarland,
now a lieutenant general, became the commander of US forces in
Iraq and Syria. . . . Even he withheld from rekindling the Awakening.
He realized that the movement was too broken and discredited to be
resurrected.” Comment.
M acFarland. I wouldn’t say that I withheld from it. I would say
that there was not an opportunity. Some of the old gang was around but
their influence was much diminished. Maliki had done a pretty thorough job of undermining the tribal structure and authority. Al-Qaeda
wasn’t as focused as ISIS on getting everyone to behave a certain way. As
long as you were taking the fight to the Americans or fighting the Shia,
that was good enough for AQI. They would worry about installing their
catechism—or whatever they call it—later.
Not so with ISIS. They were incredibly brutal. Everyone had to walk
the talk, or else. People had to live a certain way, which was onerous
even by al-Qaeda standards. Sunni tribes could sit on the fence with
al-Qaeda. As long as they let AQI fighters pass through their area, they
would often leave the tribes alone. It was live and let live. There was
none of that with ISIS. If the Sunni sheikhs felt that if in Operation Iraqi
Freedom they were caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, by
the time coalition forces returned to al-Anbar in Operation Inherent
Resolve they were completely submerged by the deep blue sea and the
devil was underwater with them. It would have been too hard; it would
have been a very artificial Awakening. It was a grassroots movement in
’06, but it would have been mostly Astroturf in 2015.
Glenn. Ultimately, Malkasian concludes, “The people of Anbar
would have been better off had the United States stayed out of Iraq in
the first place.” Your perspective?
M acFarland. Possibly. Under Saddam, that was probably true
because Saddam didn’t mess with the Sunnis too badly. Now the 60–70
percent of Iraqis elsewhere in Iraq who were Shia would probably
disagree with that. The reality is, Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd, could
all have gotten along in a federalized Iraq had we stayed engaged after we
defeated al-Qaeda. We were in the driver’s seat. We could have ensured
a good outcome for that country and put it on the road to stability.
Instead, we walked away and the country fell apart . . . much to the
advantage of the Iranians.
Right now there is a good prime minister in Iraq named Haider
al-Abadi. If we work with him I think the people of al-Anbar might
find a modus vivendi with the government of Iraq. But we’ll have to stay
engaged. It won’t be as good for the Sunnis as it was during their “salad
days” under Saddam. The Anbaris’ memory of those days is why we
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had to fight them so hard until we said, “You know, you aren’t the only
ones that don’t like the Iranians. We don’t think much of them either.”
And the scales then fell from the sheikhs’ eyes. They also realized
we could give them a lot more money than the Iranians ever would.
Unfortunately, we turned our backs on them, and they paid the price for
their partnership with the United States much as was the case with [the]
South Vietnamese.
Glenn. Were you there when Maliki stayed in power after being
defeated in an election?
M acFarland. No, but I read about it. That was a strategic
tipping point.
Glenn. Any concluding thoughts? How does this compare with
other books on the Awakening?
M acFarland. Some of them have a very noticeable slant. There’s
the Marine history of the Awakening. I won’t render judgment on that.
It’s a very complicated story. Other people have written about it. I don’t
know that anyone will get to all the little subcurrents and things that
were happening simultaneously out there, most of which I didn’t know
about, and few of which I controlled. My principal accomplishment was
managing to navigate through all those various currents and eddies to
achieve my military objectives, riding on top of them without capsizing
the boat. I didn’t know what was going on beneath the surface, especially
with the tribal dynamics. And there’s more to them than Carter has
written about or that anybody can probably ever write about or know.
None of the Sunni sheikhs are writing any books, and if they did
they would have their own bias. It’s not like the end of the Second World
War when we interviewed all the German generals and they told us,
“You did this and I did that” because they kept meticulous records and
could cross-reference what happened on a particular day. We can’t do
that in this war, so we’ll never know. The al-Qaeda guys are all dead or
scattered, and so are a lot of sheikhs. But I think Carter does as good a
job as any, and better than most, in piecing it together and coming up
with some sort of coherent narrative.
As my previous remarks make clear, tribal relations in al-Anbar
were extremely complex. For example, the chief of police in al-Anbar
worked with a sheikh. The chief of police used to be the head of the
border patrol, and the sheikh was a smuggler. It was kind of like a Road
Runner-Wile E. Coyote relationship, [a] love-hate relationship. They had
an understanding of what was allowed, what wasn’t allowed. And of
course they’re all intermarried with one another. Until you can get to
that level of understanding of the dynamics out there, it’s like walking
into a big family argument at Thanksgiving but you aren’t part of the
family. They may be talking about something that happened to a cousin’s
sister-in-law fifteen years ago. And you’re wondering, “What the hell are
you people talking about?” But they’ve all got it right there, in their
heads. It’s as if it happened yesterday to them.
Trying to understand how that perspective affected the sheikhs’
thinking, and how they dealt with one another, was a complete waste
of time for me. I just decided, “I’m just going to back a few sheikhs,
and hope the other ones will fall in line to get CERP [Commanders

24

Parameters 48(1) Spring 2018

Emergency Response program] money or whatever. That’s how I’m
going to play this game.” I couldn’t learn how to play cricket. It was too
hard for me in the time I had. I was just going find somebody to bat
for me.
A last note . . . I couldn’t have done half of what I did without
[Stu(art) Jones, ambassador to Iraq from 2014–16]. He opened a lot of
doors for me. Ambassadors are such important players, and they don’t
get enough credit.

Interviewer’s Closing Thoughts

Despite the claims of some, counterinsurgency is no more dead than
is conflict. Students of the latter continue to learn, adapting lessons from
post-World War II, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to inform
practitioners of the former. And adapt they must. Insurgents evolve,
adopting new techniques, and technologies, as well as finding some
success in urban areas, historically the graveyard of such movements.
Well-reasoned additions to the literature and clear-eyed insights, such
as those offered by Malkasian and MacFarland, provide guidance for
essential counteradaptation and, ideally, innovations that will keep us
“left of boom” in years to come.

